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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past few years, the licensing dispute between Philips and 
Taiwan CD-R and CD-RW manufacturers, such as Princo and 
Gigastorage, has been a powerful generator of new developments in the 
field of patent and competition in various countries around the world.  
For instance, in Germany, it stimulated the Supreme Court to deal with 
the applicability of antitrust defenses to injunctive relief in the context 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, National Chiao Tung University (Hsinchu, Taiwan). S.J.D. 
2007, Indiana-Bloomington.  The draft of this article has been presented in the 11th 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Chicago, August 11-12, 2011.  Thanks for all the 
suggestions and comments at the conference.  This paper partly derives from a research 
project sponsored by National Science Council, Taiwan (serial no. NSC 97-2410-H-009-023).  
It purely represents the author’s own views and is not on behalf of or influenced by the 
Council. 
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of patent infringement lawsuits, the issue that the same court left open 
in its Standard-Spundfass decision in 2004.  The Court made use of this 
occasion—the Orange-Book-Standard case in 2009—to opine upon 
contending positions on that issue, and ruled for further extending 
antitrust defenses to injunctive relief claims, and meanwhile, set up 
prerequisites for raising such defenses on the basis of abusing dominant 
positions by refusal to license.1 
In Taiwan, where the present series of controversies initially burst 
out, the Fair Trade Commission is the key enforcer of antitrust law.  In 
2001, the Commission found that Philips maintained an excessive 
royalty rate as to patents that were essential for local manufacturers to 
comply with CD-R/CD-RW specifications—the Orange Book 
standards—and, consequently, abused its monopolistic position in the 
technology market.2  This case represents a very rare instance where a 
monopolist was held to be abusing its intellectual property (IP) 
exploitatively, and, until now, was still under dispute in Taiwan judicial 
 
1.  Gerhard Barth, Patentees Beware German Antitrust Rules, MANAGING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.managingip.com/IssueArticle/2251033/Supplements/Patentees-beware-German-
antitrust-rules.html?supplementListId=72637. 
2.  Philips refused to renegotiate the royalty rate that Taiwan manufacturers originally 
agreed upon, namely, three-percent of the net sales price, but at least 10 Japanese Yen for 
each CD-R disk.  Kung-Chung Liu, Rationalising the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing 
by the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 757, 761 
(2008) (hereinafter Liu, Compulsory Patent Licensing); Kung-Chung Liu, Interface Between 
IP and Competition Law in Taiwan, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 735, 748 (2005) (hereinafter 
Liu, Interface); Ming-Yan Shieh, A Discussion of the Relationship Between the Patent Law 
and the Fair Trade Law in Taiwan with a Review of the Philips CD-R Decisions, THE FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION FRAMEWORK 155, 161–62 (Tzong-Leh Hwang & Chiyuan 
Chen eds., 2004).  Nevertheless, due to drastic price erosion (from US$ 7 for each CD-R in 
1996 to less than US$ 0.5 in 2000) and the sixty-fold growth in sales volume (from 182 million 
CD-Rs in 1997 to 3.6 billion in 2000), the maintenance of such a scheme would generate 
royalties twenty to sixty times more in 2000 than the amount originally expected by both sides 
of the parties.  Liu, Interface, supra note 2, at 748–49.  Judge Dyk also noted in his dissent 
from the Princo v. ITC en banc rehearing opinion that “[t]he royalty rate has ranged from 
one-half to two-thirds the manufacturers' selling price for the discs.  This has enabled Philips 
and the other members of the patent pool to collectively secure hundreds-of-millions, if not 
billions, of dollars in revenue from the sale of those discs.” Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 
1318, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting).  For other issues disposed in the 
commission decision including cartel and tying arrangement see TU THANH NGUYEN, 
COMPETITION LAW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 204–06 (2010); Shieh, supra note 2, at 162; 
Bruce Y. Hsueh & Morris Tu, Application of Market Level Analysis in Anti-Trust Regulation 
on IP Licensing—The Philips CD-R Case in Taiwan, 23 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. & 
AFF. 73, 73–76 (2005); Liu, Interface, supra note 2, at 747–49. 
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proceedings.3  Additionally, the Taiwan Intellectual Property Office 
once granted compulsory licenses on Philips’ patents at dispute to local 
CD-R producers, but was later reversed on appeal and vacated by the 
Taipei Administrative High Court.4 
Turning back to the United States, the Philips CD-R/CD-RW 
licensing dispute arose chiefly from the exclusionary order proceedings, 
which is a court-style procedure administered by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) aiming to forestall IP-infringing products from 
entering into the United States.5  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.) possesses appellate jurisdiction over this class 
of cases arising from the ITC proceedings, as it does in patent 
infringement ligation.6  Since 2005, the Fed. Cir. brought out three 
consecutive major decisions adjudicating the present dispute, 
culminating at the Princo Corporation v. ITC en banc decision in 2010.7  
These decisions substantially changed the landscape of the patent-
misuse doctrine in general, and tying arrangement as a defense to patent 
infringement litigation in particular.  They broke away from the 
traditional dichotomy between coercion and voluntariness in judging the 
legitimacy of mandatory package licenses.8  Instead, in the Philips-series 
cases, the Fed. Cir. consistently held that tying arrangements between 
patents should be analyzed under rule of reason, and put emphasis on 
actual or probable foreclosure of both technically and commercially 
viable alternative technologies.9 
What is unique in the Princo en banc rehearing decision is that the 
 
3.  Liu, Compulsory Patent Licensing, supra note 2, 761–62; NGUYEN, supra note 2, at 
206; Ching-fu Lin, Filling in the Gaps of the TRIPS Agreement: Reflections on the Taiwan-
Philips CD-R Compulsory License Case, 3 ASIAN J WTO & INT’L HEALTH LAW & POL’Y 
556, 563–64 (2008). 
4.  NGUYEN, supra note 2, at 209–10; Lin, supra note 3, at 561–62; Liu, Interface, supra 
note 2, at 739–41. 
5.  Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
6.  Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). 
7.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
8.  The Supreme Court laid down this dichotomy in two decisions dealing with 
basically the same license scheme.  See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 
339 U.S. 827 (1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).  See 
also 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.3a, at 3–24 to 3–29 (2d ed. 
2010). 
9.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1337–39; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1314–15 (citing U.S. 
Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 
1188–94. 
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court expanded the impact that the present dispute brought about 
concerning the entire array of patent-misuse.  The majority of the Fed. 
Cir. unequivocally held that only restrictions on the licensee’s use of the 
patented invention would possibly constitute patent misuse.10  
Consequently, any other type of restriction or extension caused by the 
patent owners in exercising their patent rights is eliminated from the 
reach of the patent-misuse doctrine.11  The court went even further in 
this decision, holding that antitrust violations based on patent rights do 
not unavoidably constitute patent-misuse at the same time, even if with 
that violation the owner extends the patent grant out of the metes and 
bounds of the claims recited in the same patents.12  Those two separate 
but related rulings significantly curtailed the formerly applicable scope 
of the misuse doctrine, and as a result, substantially undermined its 
imperative function as a counterweight guarding against overreaching 
patent exploitation and infringement allegations. 
The goal of this article is to review these two far-reaching holdings in 
the en banc decision.  The author will explore their implications for 
patent law and market competition, and make meticulous assessments 
and reflections from doctrinal, policy, and functional dimensions.  As a 
matter of fact, the court still delivered a third ruling in the same 
decision.  The majority concluded that for a misuse defense to prevail 
based on agreement to suppress nascent technologies, the defendant has 
to prove that absent this suppress-and-non-compete agreement, the 
nascent technologies should have enjoyed reasonable probabilities to 
turn into technically and commercially viable alternatives to the 
patented inventions.13  Although the double viability requirement that 
the court put forward may also perversely affect the function of the 
misuse doctrine and is therefore worthy of examination, it would be 
more preferable to leave this critical and broadly-related issue for a 
separate and more focused investigation on a future day. 
On the substance of the en banc decision, following careful 
examination of relevant statutes, case law, and their respective 
 
10.  On the two issues summarized in this paragraph, the majority of the court 
composed of six judges: Chief Judge Rader, and Judges Bryson, Newman, Lourie, Linn, and 
Moore; Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321.  The dissenters, Judges Dyk and Gajarsa, vigorously 
opposed the majority’s view. See id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  The concurring judges, 
Judges Prost and Mayer, casted doubt on the majority’s holdings, but preferred not to make 
rulings on those issues.  See id. at 1341 (Prost, J., concurring). 
11.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1330–33. 
12.  Id. at 1329–30, 1333 n.6. 
13.  Id. at 1336–37. 
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reasoning and fundamental policy concerns, this article proceeds to 
argue that the Fed. Cir.’s first two rulings regarding the applicable scope 
of the patent-misuse doctrine deviated from both Supreme Court and 
past Fed. Cir. precedent.  However, except for fact patterns summarized 
from many of the precedents but relatively trivial to the primary 
principles of the misuse doctrine, there is nothing in the present decision 
providing adequate and sufficient reasoning for this breakaway from 
settled case law.  Nor did the court proffer any meaningful policy 
grounds for this sudden turn on the law of misuse.  Taking into account 
the possible polymorphism of the ways in which the patentees misuse 
their patent rights, which are difficult to predict ex ante and classify 
beforehand to certain fixed categories, the holdings of the en banc 
decision holding back the misuse doctrine to categories that have 
previously appeared in judicial opinions do not seem to be sound and 
well-deliberated decisions from a policy perspective. 
Furthermore, the Fed. Cir. did not answer the core question that will 
occur as to the rulings on the scope of the misuse doctrine.  The key 
problem that commentators may doubt is why those restrictions based 
on patent rights, imposed on parties other than the licensees but still 
contravening the antitrust laws and causing considerable 
anticompetitive harm to the economic welfare of our society, will never 
be considered as misuse of patent rights?  In other words, the 
fundamental inquiry resulting from the holdings is how patent abuse 
targeted against non-licensees would never be misuse under patent law?  
The court did not provide any conceivable clue in the majority opinion 
to answer this question, nor did it articulate its reason for viewing this 
type of misuse more condemnable than other types of restraints on 
trade.  It also failed to proffer any grounds for maintaining double 
remedies from patent and antitrust law only for misuse on licensees, but 
not for misuse residing otherwise.  From a functional viewpoint, these 
mismatches create apparent disparities in the strength of legal 
protection and practical remedies against similar patent-abusing 
behaviors.  Without comprehensible justification, the Fed. Cir. suddenly 
retreated in this decision from a heated battlefield that is in need of 
regulation by the patent-misuse doctrine, at least as much regulation as 
is afforded in other areas where the court chooses to keep faithful to the 
commitment of enforcing patent-misuse. 
This article is poised to expand and develop those substantive 
observations into full-fledged investigation and comprehensive 
assessment on this momentous judicial decision.  The rest of this 
comment will be organized in the following manner.  In Part I the 
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author will briefly describe the Philips CD-R/CR-RW dispute and the 
technologies at issue in this en banc decision.  Next, in Part II to Part IV, 
this article will review and evaluate the court’s rulings from doctrinal, 
policy, and functional viewpoints, respectively, as summarized in the 
preceding paragraphs.  The possible counter argument will be 
considered and carefully analyzed in Part V, and Part VI will be a short 
summary and conclusion. 
II. PHILIPS CD-R/CR-RW DISPUTE AND THE EN BANC DECISION 
Philips, Sony, and two other companies (Taiyo Yuden and Ricoh) 
own patents concerning the production of recordable compact discs 
(CD-R) and rewritable compact discs (CD-RW).14  Many of those 
patents cover technologies used on CD-R and CD-RW discs that are 
indispensible for them to comply with the “Orange Book,” a technical 
specification jointly developed by Philips and Sony in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.15  In producing CD-Rs and CD-RWs, manufacturers have to 
follow the Orange Book standard to assure the compatibility of those 
discs with CD drives set up on computers and consumer electronics, 
including audio and video systems installed on cars or at home, which 
are also manufactured in accordance with the Orange Book standard.16 
In the early 1990s, the companies agreed to aggregate their Orange 
Book-related patents to configure patent pools for the ease of 
management and outward licensing.17  Philips, Sony, and Taiyo Yuden 
pooled respective CD-R patents and brought out a joint package license 
for those patents.18  Ricoh, Sony, and Philips also concentrated CD-RW 
patents and licensed them out in a similar manner.19  In return for a 
share of royalties from the pools, Sony, Taiyo Yuden, and Ricoh 
authorized Philips to run the two pools and to grant package licenses to 
worldwide manufacturers who produced Orange-Book compliant discs, 
drives, and players.20  Interested licensees could only choose among the 
package licenses put forth by Philips; individual patents were not 
offered for licensing.21  Those package licenses required manufacturers 
 
14.  Id. at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
15.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
16.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321–22; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303; Hsueh & Tu, 
supra note 2, at 74; Shieh, supra note 2, at 161. 
17.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
18.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
19.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
20.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1343; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
21.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303; U.S. Philips Corp. 
WANG- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:06 AM 
2012]       DEVIATED, UNSOUND, AND SELF-RETREATING 57 
 
to pay a per-disc royalty on each CD-R or CD-RW sold where at least 
one licensed invention was in use during the production process.22  The 
per-disc royalty did not vary in portion to which, or how many technical 
aspects covered by licensed patents actually found themselves in 
producing the discs, “meaning that licensees must pay a royalty based 
on the number of discs manufactured regardless of how many of the 
patents are actually used in the manufacturing.”23 
One aspect of the CD-R/RW patented technology is actually at issue 
in the en banc case.24  In order for a CD player to adequately locate its 
reader or writer when reading or writing data onto the compact discs, 
all-time position information has to be encoded onto CD-Rs and CD-
RWs to ensure accurate positioning of the player.25  In the course of 
developing the Orange Book standard, the Sony and Philips engineers 
discovered this problem and configured different solutions to deal with 
it.26  Philips’s solution was to follow an analog approach to modulating 
the frequency of the “groove” on the disc, so as to insert location codes 
onto the disc.27  One of Sony’s proposals to conquer this problem was to 
mark location codes in the groove by using a digital modulation 
method.28  Philips’s approach was later covered by two of its patents at 
issue in this case, referred to as the “Raaymakers patents.”29  Sony 
prosecuted another patent to protect its corresponding technology as 
well, referred to as the “Lagadec patent.”30  The Raaymakers and 
Lagadec technologies perform the same basic function in dissimilar 
ways, and are in essence mutually incompatible.31  Given the fact that 
both of the technical approaches could interoperate backwards with 
then-existing CD players, such as CD-ROM drives, they are reciprocally 
substitutable and in direct competition with each other.32 
After investigating the two contending solutions, the Sony and 
Philips engineers agreed to use the Raaymakers technology, rather than 
 
v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
22.  Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
23.  In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also U.S. Philips Corp. 
v. Princo Corp., 173 Fed. Appx. 832, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
24.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322. 
25.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305–06. 
26.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1344; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305. 
27.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322. 
28.  Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305. 
29.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305. 
30.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1305–06. 
31.  Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306. 
32.  Id. 
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the Lagadec approach, to solve this problem.33  They consequently 
incorporated the Raaymakers technology into the Orange Book 
standard for the CD-R/RW manufacturing.34  In the joint patent 
packages for licensing to manufacturers, Philips included the patents 
that it considered substantially necessary to produce Orange-Book 
compatible CD-R/RW discs, which contained both the Raaymakers and 
Lagadec patents simultaneously.35  Those joint package licenses 
contained a “field of use” restraint, limiting the licensees to employing 
the licensed technologies only for the purpose of producing compact 
discs in compliance with the Orange Book standard.36  Later in 2001, 
following the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission handing down violation 
findings against three CD-R joint licensors, Philips began to offer 
additional package options, grouping relevant patents into two 
categories, labeled “essential” and “nonessential,” for producing CD-Rs 
and CD-RWs.37  Both the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents were 
classified as essential.38 
In the late 1990s, Princo, a company from Taiwan, manufactured 
CD-Rs and CD-RWs in compliance with the Orange Book standard and 
also covered by the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents.39  This company 
sought to import those disc products into the U.S. market, and therefore 
entered into a package license agreement with Philips for those 
patents.40  Unfortunately, the licensing relationship did not last long.41  
Due to the high royalty rate of the package license, Princo soon 
declined to pay royalties.42 Philips terminated the license agreement in 
response, and initiated a proceeding before the International Trade 
Commission (ITC).43  Philips asserted that while importing compact 
discs covered by the pooled and unlicensed patents into the United 
States, Princo had violated section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 
1930,44 and requested the ITC to issue an exclusionary order to expel 
 
33.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306. 
34.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306. 
35.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1306. 
36.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1320. 
37.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1322–23. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
40.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
41.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
42.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
43.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; Princo Corp., 563 F.3d at 1303. 
44.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
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Princo’s CD-R and CD-RW products from importation.45  Princo 
alleged the patent-misuse doctrine against Philips as its affirmative 
defense.46 
The ITC initially found Philips misused the pooled patents because 
the package licenses it offered were mandatory and thereby tied the 
patents that were essential to fulfilling the Orange Book standard with 
those patents that were not essential.47  The Fed. Cir. reversed, 
concluding that no illegal tying could be properly established regarding 
patents then in question, and remanded to the ITC for further 
determination of whether Philips had engaged in other behavior that 
could be considered misuse.48  In the second-round proceedings, the ITC 
rejected Princo’s contention that including the Lagadec patent in the 
package license constituted unlawful tying arrangement, and held that 
the agreement between Sony and Philips not to license the Lagadec 
patent in competition with the Orange Book patent package, especially 
the Raaymakers patents incorporated therein, was not misuse as well.49  
The original Fed. Cir. panel opinion agreed that the ITC had righteously 
rejected the Lagadec tying claim, but erred in rejecting the misuse claim 
based on the agreement not to license the Lagadec technology as a 
substitute for Raaymakers approach adopted in the Orange Book.50  
However, on rehearing en banc, the entire Fed. Cir. reversed the panel 
opinion and held that the agreement not to license the Lagadec patent 
independently did not constitute misuse.51 
III. MISUSE ABRIDGED: DEVIATING FROM PRECEDENTS AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In addition to ruling on a non-compete agreement that might exist 
 
45.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323. 
46.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323; U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182–83 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
47.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323. 
48.  Id. at 1323–24. 
49.  Id. at 1324. 
50.  Claim 6 of the Lagadec patent is arguably broad enough to embrace the 
Raaymakers technology.  Though uncertainty existed as to the scope of this claim, the Fed. 
Cir. panel considered it would be reasonable for a manufacturer to believe a license on claim 
6 was necessary when entering into the package license agreement with Philips.  The Lagadec 
patent would therefore be rationally classified as an essential patent for practicing the 
Raaymakers technology, and the Orange Book standard as a whole.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 
F.3d 1301, 1309–12 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
51.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1323–26.  The majority opinion does not disturb the 
original panel’s ruling with respect to the inclusion of the Lagadec patent in the package 
license not constituting unlawful tying arrangement.  Id. at 1345 n.7 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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between Sony and Philips with regard to Lagadec and Raaymakers 
technologies, the Fed. Cir. delivered two more limitations in the en banc 
decision on the basic framework and applicable scope of the patent-
misuse doctrine.52  The first is that only restrictions on the use of patents 
by the licensees would constitute patent-misuse.53  The second makes 
clear that antitrust violations that involve extension of the patent grant 
do not necessarily denote patent-misuse.54 
These rulings brought patent-misuse jurisprudence into a brand new 
age.  Before this decision, the existing principle for judging patent-
misuse was declared in Windsurfing55, and reiterated in Mallinckrodt56 
and Virginia Panel57, all decided by the Fed. Cir.  The court in 
Windsurfing framed the test as: “the alleged infringer [must] show that 
the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal 
scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”58  The two 
elements that come to light from this test are broadening the patent 
scope in effect and the broadening affecting the competition.59  There 
was no express constraint in the test limiting misuse to restrictions 
imposed on licensees only, nor was there an implied restraint to the 
same effect in the Fed. Cir.’s decisions.  In contrast, there have been 
Fed. Cir. cases clearly pointing to the contrary.  In Virginia Panel, the 
court explained that an antitrust violation “requires more exacting proof 
than suffices to demonstrate patent misuse,” such as evidence to 
establish an intent to monopolize and damages attributable to the 
asserted misuse conduct.60  The fact that fewer elements are required for 
the court to substantiate patent-misuse allegations may suggest that it 
enjoys a more spacious scope than that of antitrust violations similarly 
involving extending the patent’s influence beyond its legal grant.  The 
court made the same point more straightforward in C.R. Bard.  In that 
case, the panel’s opinion plainly enunciated that “[p]atent misuse is 
viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . . Thus misuse 
 
52.  Id. at 1327–28. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 1328. 
55.  Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
56.  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
57.  Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–71 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
58.  Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001. 
59.  See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2 at 3–8. 
60.  Virginia Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 872 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–41(1969)). 
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may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met.”61 
The pre-existing case law highlights this question: why does the Fed. 
Cir. overturn its attitude in the present case?  What are the factors and 
underlying reasons that advise the court to make this change happen?  
As expressed by the majority in the en banc decision, the rationale lies 
in the pervasive protection that the law would like to provide for 
patents, and a consistent fact feature in the misuse cases, which has 
rarely been noticed in the past.62  The majority opinion indicated that 
the patentee was entitled to substantial rights under a broad scope of 
the patent grant.63  The right to impose a variety of conditions in 
licensing the patents is also one of the key capabilities possessed by the 
patent owners.64  For this reason, the doctrine of patent-misuse has 
largely been confined to certain types of the patentee’s practices.65 
In light of these observations, the majority opinion narrowly re-
interpreted the existing test for patent-misuse.  It first emphasized that 
misconduct eligible for the misuse defense had to be rooted in the “use” 
of the patent.66  The majority went on to state that those restrictions that 
the patentees imposed on licensees were the only type of constraining 
practices targeted precisely at the “use” of the patents.  Other types of 
patent abuse, therefore, were not a suitable category for the misuse 
defense.67  Secondly, the en banc majority considered that only those 
specific practices that the courts had previously recognized as patent-
misuse could sustain such an allegation raised by the defendant.68  It 
further analyzed the facts of past cases in which it had affirmed misuse 
allegations and concrete examples referred to in the legislative process 
of the Patent Licensing Reform Act of 1988.69  The opinion came to the 
conclusion that in all those cases and examples, patent-misuse arose 
 
61.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–41 (1969)).  
62.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328•29 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 1328–29 (citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 
1982)). 
66.  Id. at 1331. 
67.  Id. at 1329, 1331–32 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)); See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1971); 
McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 238–39 (10th Cir. 1968); Republic 
Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1963)). 
68.  Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1329. 
69.  Id. at 1330. 
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invariably from restrictions that the patentees imposed on licensees 
regarding the use of the licensed patents.70  It considered that this 
similarity appeared to be a rule implied by previous courts in the 
precedents.  Based on this two-fold reasoning, the court consequently 
added this new element, though retrieved from past decisions, into the 
criteria that the defendant had to satisfy in asserting the misuse 
defense.71 
A. Over-Construing Previous Decisions 
If you were to check the precedents that the court recited in the en 
banc decision to support its reasoning, you might be surprised that little 
reference or suggestion to the restriction-on-licensee requirement, if 
any, can be found.  Furthermore, the reference to the “use” of the 
patent, though appearing in past decisions, actually did not work to the 
purpose of advocating or bolstering the requirement as such.  For 
instance, the conduct at issue in C.R. Bard, concerning the misuse claim, 
was that the patent owner was suing for infringement with knowledge 
that no actual infringement had ever occurred.  The panel unanimously 
concluded that because there was no substantial evidence showing this 
litigation was objectively baseless and brought in bad faith, it was 
insufficient to establish antitrust liability on the “sham litigation” 
theory.72  The panel rejected a parallel allegation of patent-misuse as 
well.  In addressing this defense, the panel stressed that the misuse 
doctrine should not be expanded into an “open-ended pitfall” for any 
type of wrongful use of the patents.73  The misconduct asserted in this 
case neither occurred in the licensing context, nor was the question of 
whether it related to the “use” of the patent ever raised in assessing the 
misuse claim.  The panel revealed no intention to narrow the scope of 
misuse and there was no reference to any restriction on licensees.  
Similarly, in the Virginia Panel decision, although the Fed. Cir. referred 
to “use of the patent” when describing the alleged misconduct, the case 
would be better understood primarily as a tying arrangement lacking the 
coercion element, thus failing to meet the test for this type of patent-
misuse.74  The factor of using the patent or not did not actually play an 
 
70.  Id. at 1330–33. 
71.  Id. at 1331. 
72.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1368, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(Bryson, J., concurring and dissenting-in-part). 
73.  Id. at 1373. 
74.  Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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important role in reaching the conclusion in this case.75 
Besides these two Fed. Cir. cases, the decisions that were made 
before the establishment of the Fed. Cir. have generally demonstrated 
similar situations.  For example, in Kolene Corporation, the Sixth 
Circuit stated that “[w]e know of no authority suggesting that there can 
be a defense to a patent infringement suit based on ‘misuse in the 
air’ . . . The misuse must be of the patent in suit . . . . “76  The real 
condition the court encountered in that case, however, was the 
defendant’s contention that the plaintiff-patentee’s tying of her “service 
mark” license with unpatented products amounted to “patent” misuse 
as well.77  The Sixth Circuit harshly refuted this allegation in its opinion, 
and reiterated the bottom line for a misuse allegation, which the Federal 
Circuit quoted in the present case: “the patent in suit [must] itself 
significantly contribute[ ] to the practice under attack.”78  The same 
notion was also employed in McCullough Tool Company,79 a Tenth 
Circuit case cited in the present Fed. Cir. decision, to rule against an off-
the-mark misuse accusation.  The practice at issue was the plaintiff-
patentee suing approximately fifteen different operators for 
infringement of eight to ten different patents.80  Some of the 
infringement allegations were dismissed after discovery ended in those 
cases.81  In the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, it was clear that the plaintiff had 
a reasonable basis for alleging infringement by operators of the patents 
at issue.82  As for the remainder of the patents, the court indicated what 
the Fed. Cir. quoted in the Princo case, that the patent-misuse defense 
was allowed “only where there had been a misuse of the patent in 
suit.”83  Thus, the defense in this case was confined to misconduct in 
relation to, or in any manner connected with, the matter at dispute in 
the infringement proceeding.84 
From the analysis above, you can see “the use of the patent” concept 
barely functioned as a meaningful constraint—instead of a general and 
broad delineation—of the scope of the patent-misuse defense.  Nor did 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th Cir. 1971). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79.  McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1968). 
80.  Id. at 238. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 237. 
83.  Id. at 238. 
84.  Id. at 238–41.  
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any prerequisite to patent-misuse, such as restrictions being imposed on 
a licensee about how he or she exploits the patent, ever appear in prior 
decisions. 
In addition to over construing previous court decisions in order to 
support the restriction-on-licensee requirement, the Fed. Cir. also erred 
in dismissing past decisions that stood opposite to its current view.  The 
majority does not understand those past decisions according to their 
individual contexts, and rejects their holdings too lightly. The primary 
judicial decision that Princo relied on in the en banc proceeding, 
Compton v. Metal Products, Inc.,85 is the most prominent case that the 
court misinterprets.  The majority opinion distinguished the Compton 
case on its facts, and denounced it for transgressing precedents by 
finding misuse in a patentee’s self-restraint on the use of the patent.86  If 
you reset the case back to its original context, you will easily come up 
with a quite different view of this decision.  By restraining its own 
freedom in using the patent at suit, Compton, the patentee, struck a 
non-compete agreement with its exclusive licensee in exchange for 
royalties.87  More importantly, this agreement was not confined to the 
patent or patented products that Compton actually licensed, but instead 
covered the entire type of equipment that the Compton patent 
connected to.88  In other words, the issue in this case was a cross-the-
board, non-compete-and-share collusion between competitors, which is 
very similar to the facts presented in the Princo case.  The major 
concern with this agreement was not that the patent owner constrained 
its own freedom to facilitate the transaction of exclusive license, but that 
the agreement eliminated the competition between the patentee and 
exclusive licensee regarding the entire category of equipment.  Besides 
this anticompetitive effect, the agreement extended the exclusive terrain 
of the patent at dispute beyond its legal scope to affect the whole 
category of equipment, which satisfied the remaining element of the test 
for misuse that the Fed. Cir. maintained before the Princo en banc 
decision.89  The collusion, nevertheless, did not contain restrictions on 
the licensee’s use of the patent, the very element that is frequently 
 
85.  Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1971). 
86.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
87.  Compton, 453 F.2d at 43–44. 
88.  Id. at 46. 
89.  See Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Virginia Panel Corp. v. 
Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, (Fed. Cir. 1997); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 1998).                        
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missing in the decisions cited for support by the Princo majority.  
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to justify why the Princo majority 
excluded the Compton case from consideration, but not the decisions 
actually cited in the opinion.  This disparity in surveying and assessing 
relevant case law would undeniably undermine the objectivity and 
strength of the en banc decision, in particular, when it occurs to such a 
controversial and worldwide-attended dispute. 
B. Deviating from Supreme Court Precedent 
Beyond the level of appellate court decisions, the more profound 
problem that the Fed. Cir. currently comes across is the observable gap 
between the Princo decision and prior United States Supreme Court 
precedents regarding the patent-misuse doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court put the idea of patent-misuse forward for the first time in Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,90 but it was not until its 
1941 decision in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.91 that the Supreme 
Court gave full shape and concrete substance, including the name of 
“patent-misuse”, to the doctrine.92  Initially, in Morton Salt, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment since its 
finding of misuse was not supported by evidence showing the patent 
owner’s tying practices had violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the 
corresponding antitrust law.93  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It 
proclaimed that the key inquiry for patent-misuse is not whether the 
patent owner contravenes antitrust law, but whether a court of equity 
will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when the plaintiff-
patentee is using it as an effective means to forestall competition 
beyond the scope of rights that the patent grant provides.94  The Court 
went on to elaborate: 
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent 
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to * * * 
 
90.  Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  See 1 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a at 3-3 (noting the Motion Picture Patents case was 
the first application of the principle embodied in patent-misuse); Robin C. Feldman, The 
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 409 (2003) (noting 
this case established what later developed into the doctrine of patent-misuse). 
91.  Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
92.  See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 907–09 (2007). 
93.  Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490. 
94.  Id. at 490–91. 
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Inventors the exclusive Right * * *’ to their ‘new and useful’ 
inventions. But the public policy which includes inventions within 
the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in 
the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an 
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent 
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.95 
The Court explicitly expressed its primary concern that underlies the 
rise of the patent-misuse doctrine.96  It is the public policy to promote 
the progress of innovation that further determines the balance between 
what patents do and do not cover that requires the misuse doctrine to 
guard against the patentee from transgressing the boundary of rights 
granted by the patent office.97  The scope of patent rights is ascertained 
by patent examiners through intensive and professional investigations.  
Overreaching the rights beyond their boundaries may enclose 
technologies commonly known or obvious for skilled artisans into a 
patentee’s exclusive terrain, rewarding the patent owner for what she 
does not actually invent.  This type of reward would encourage free-
riding on existing inventions, or stifle competition in areas the patent 
office intentionally leaves open for rivalry.  No matter which of the 
above in fact occurs, it is definitely not these inventive activities that the 
patent system is destined to promote.98  In addition to all of these, the 
patent grant expanded by the misuse conduct may also encumber 
subsequent inventions due to the need it generates for follow-on 
inventors to clear the extended patent rights that blocks on the path of 
subsequent innovation, causing another layer of disincentive similar to 
anticommons or patent thickets, which have been intensively discussed 
in recent years.99 
 
95.  Id. at 492 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
96.  Id.  
97.  See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 484–86 
(2011); Cotter, supra note 92, at 908; Feldman, supra note 90, at 409–11; Marshall Leaffer, 
Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142, 147–48 (2010); Joe Potenza et al., 
Patent Misuse—The Critical Balance, A Patent Lawyer’s View, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 69–70, 
77–78 (2005); Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922, 1925–
26 (1997). 
98.  The Motion Picture Patents Co. case is another source for similar analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s patent misuse policy.  See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a, at 3-
3−3-5; Feldman, supra note 90, at 405–09; Leaffer, supra note 97, at 148–49. 
99.  See Feldman, supra note 90, at 435; Leaffer, supra note 97, at 158.  For the 
anticommons theory see generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); 
Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for 
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According to Morton Salt, the patent policy behind the misuse 
doctrine is therefore aimed at safeguarding the open field of 
competition lying outside of the patent grant from the intrusion of 
patent owners.  Although mixed with specific tests and arguments 
borrowed from antitrust law to assist in deciding misuse in individual 
cases,100 the high court has consistently kept the same patent policy as its 
chief concern when applying the misuse doctrine.  The Court 
maintained this principle all the way through to the most recent cases it 
handled relating to the misuse doctrine.  It articulated in Zenith Radio, 
the last case in which the Supreme Court found misuse, that a patentee 
might not use the power of his patent to levy a charge for activities not 
within the reach of the patent as granted by the government.101  In the 
same vein, in the Blonder-Tongue decision, the final case where the 
Supreme Court discussed the basic rationale of this doctrine,102 the 
Court’s opinion referred to prior misuse cases as “the series of decisions 
in which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or 
temporal scope of the patent monopoly.”103  In quoting Mercoid, the 
 
Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 280–87 
(2008).  Relatively speaking, anticommons theorists put more emphasis on massive patents 
one may face in the research and development process. “Patent thickets” are a similar notion 
with a somewhat different focus. It stressed patent proliferation on the end products or their 
manufacturing processes.  For a discussion of patent thickets see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
100.  Some commentators argued the mixture with antitrust considerations blurred the 
misuse doctrine with antitrust policy, turning that doctrine into “a common law of antitrust.” 
J. Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
357, 369–75 (1990); Note, supra note 97, at 1926.  Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court 
indicated in Transparent-Wrap Machinery Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., which the 
commentators cited to support their argument, a misconduct that transgressed the patent 
boundary and demonstrated anticompetitive tendency, though falling short of antitrust 
violation, could still be condemned as patent-misuse.  329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947).  This holding 
fully exemplified that the misuse doctrine has separate and independent, though 
complementary and sometimes similar, policy underpinnings than that of antitrust law.  See 
also Potenza et al., supra note 97, at 70–71 (supporting antitrust considerations in determining 
patent misuse cases). 
101.  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 136–37 (citing Brulotte 
v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)). 
102.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., 
dissenting); Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., is the last misuse case that the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered, but it concentrated only on the issues of contributory 
infringement and statutory interpretation of § 271(c)–(d) of the 1952 Patent Act. 448 U.S. 176 
(1980).  Even so, Justice Blackmun described the misuse doctrine for the majority in brief: “a 
patentee should be denied relief against infringers if he has attempted illegally to extend the 
scope of his patent monopoly." Id. at 180–81. 
103.  Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). 
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Court unequivocally pointed out: “[t]he method by which the monopoly 
is sought to be extended is immaterial.  The patent is a privilege . . . . It 
results from invention and is limited to the invention which it defines.”104 
After tracing back previous Supreme Court decisions on patent-
misuse, it is more evident that the restriction-on-licensee requirement is 
a newly-created affix to the misuse doctrine, yet it is undeniably 
inconsistent with the principle that the Court already delivered in a 
series of cases regarding this defense.  Since 2006, there has been an 
increasing number of Fed. Cir. decisions reversed by the Supreme Court 
in the area of patent law.  The cases that have been overturned in this 
period include eBay,105 MedImmune,106 KSR,107 and Quanta Computer,108 
all involving Fed. Cir. case law that already drifted away from Supreme 
Court precedents predating the Fed. Cir’s establishment in 1982.  In 
those cases, the Supreme Court continuously set aside category-specific 
rules gradually instituted by the Fed. Cir., and brought the law back to 
the more general, flexible, and open-ended rules as crafted in its prior 
decisions.109  In fact, the Princo en banc decision created a specific 
requirement for asserting the misuse defense, and arguably deviated 
from Supreme Court precedent.  The Princo decision possessed nearly 
all the listed features shared in the series of overturned cases since 2006.  
Even if it survives a petition for certiorari, the holdings in the Princo 
decision may still be vulnerable to future challenges, and will possibly 
have to live an unstable and contentious life.110 
 
104.  Id. at 344 (citing Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944)). 
105.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
106.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
107.  KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
108.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
109.  Hill Wellford, Is the Supreme Court Importing Antitrust Economics into Patent 
Law? A Different Look at eBay, MedImmune, KSR, and Quanta Computer, THE ONLINE 
MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, MARCH 2009, at 12–14. 
110.  See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011) (certiorari denied).  The pre-
existing Fed. Cir. rule actually requires defendants asserting the misuse defense to prove 
anticompetitive effects such as unreasonable restraint on competition and foreclosure to the 
extent similar to an antitrust claim.  See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (discussing antitrust 
law)); U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Such a requirement 
might also contradict with earlier Supreme Court precedents.  See Feldman, supra note 90, at 
401–02; see also HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.2a, at 3–6 (acknowledging that the 
Fed. Cir. substantially cut back the scope of patent-misuse, confining it predominantly to 
conduct also violating antitrust law); Bohannan, supra note 97, at 490 (indicating that the 
Supreme Court’s misuse finding in Motion Pictures Patents Co. did not rely on antitrust law, 
but was firmly grounded in its IP policy). 
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C. Neglecting Legislative History 
With regard to the relationship between the patent-misuse doctrine 
and antitrust law, it has been argued that with the enactment of the 
Patent Misuse Reform Act in 1988, Congress intended to confine the 
scope of the misuse doctrine to bring it in line with antitrust law.111  If 
you look into the real process of that amendment to the Patent Act, 
however, you will perceive the legislative intent quite differently from 
that description.  The Senate first passed a bill that would have the 
misuse defense truly coexistent with the antitrust rules.  It stipulated 
that misuse findings could not be sustained unless the patent owner’s 
“practices or actions or inactions . . . violate[d] the antitrust laws.”112  
The House nonetheless preferred retaining patent-misuse as a distinct 
doctrine.  Instead, the House counterpart, House Report 4086, recited 
the categories of restrictions that most courts had identified as misuse.113  
Through mutual compromise, the two chambers of Congress eventually 
reached consensus.  The enacted amendment only added a safe harbor 
to the Patent Act to shelter two specific types of practices from the 
misuse defense.114  The first category is refusal to license, and the second 
is tying arrangements where the patent owner fails to possess market 
power in the relevant market.115 
The entire legislative process undoubtedly demonstrated that 
Congress not only had no intention of confining the scope of patent-
misuse to the antitrust terrain, but instead, positively maintained the 
defense as a lone standing doctrine with coverage broader than its 
antitrust counterpart.  In the Princo en banc decision, however, the Fed. 
Cir. majority announced that antitrust violations, even involving 
extension of the patent grant, would not necessarily constitute misuse.116  
With this ruling, the Fed. Cir. arguably reduced the misuse scope to be 
even narrower than antitrust.  This judicial move did not follow the 
legislative intent of keeping the broader scope of the misuse doctrine 
 
111.  See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
112.  Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments 
in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 264 (citing the Intellectual Property 
Antitrust Protection Act of 1988, S. 438, 100th Cong. § 201 (1988)). 
113.  H.R. 4086, 100th Cong. (1988).  See also 134 Cong. Rec. 3261 (1988) (statement of 
Rep. Robert Kastenmeier); Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove 
an Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–4 (1989). 
114.  Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust 
Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (1989); Webb & Locke, supra note 112, at 264–65. 
115.  35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006). 
116.  See, e.g., Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1328. 
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intact: running against the will of Congress as expressed in the last 
revision of the pertinent patent statutes.  Accordingly, these rulings by 
the Fed. Cir. were unable to find affirmative support from the legislative 
history of the 1988 amendment. 
IV. UNSOUND POLICY DECISION: CONSTRAINING EQUITABLE 
FLEXIBILITY 
The reasoning put forth in the Princo decision, with regard to adding 
the restriction-on-licensee requirement for patent-misuse, is not 
sufficiently clear and abundant.  The majority referred to retaining the 
pervasive protection of patent rights as its primary rationale, and 
consequently, narrowly controlled the scope of the misuse doctrine as a 
defense to patent infringement.117  However, there lacked a link in logic 
between the majority’s reasoning and the restriction-on-licensee 
requirement.  Without proper judicial precedents as its basis, why did 
the majority choose restriction-on-licensees as a suitable new element to 
control the scope of patent-misuse instead of other possible manners, 
such as tightening the interpretation of the existing misuse test or 
leveling up the evidentiary requirement for proving elements already 
contained in the misuse test?118  The opinion did not answer this 
question, nor did it provide any rationale connecting the new element to 
the court’s underlying concerns.  Therefore, a gap in logic resulted in the 
court’s reasoning regarding the new requirement of the misuse doctrine. 
In addition to this logical gap in reasoning, the majority’s new 
limitation may also generate false negatives in identifying misuse.  As 
the Fed. Cir. stated in B. Braun Medical, the patent-misuse doctrine is 
an extension of the equitable tort law doctrine of unclean hands. .119  The 
guiding principle for that doctrine is the maxim “he who comes into 
equity must come with clean hands.”120  While “equity does not demand 
 
117.  Id. at 1328–29.  See also id. at 1322–23; Pinco Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1306, 
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
118.  Beginning with Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Fed. Cir. has made 
use of heightened evidentiary requirement to control damage awards in patent infringement 
lawsuits. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 632 
F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2009 WL 1405208 (N.D.N.Y. May 15, 2009). 
119.  B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 
Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed.Cir.1986)).  See also Morton Salt Co. v. 
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). 
120.  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 
(1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 241 (1933). 
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that its suitors shall have led blameless lives,”121 the maxim does require 
that plaintiffs shall have acted reasonably, with conscience, and without 
fraud or deceit as to the matters they raise in litigation.122 
For the most part, courts are concerned with their integrity when 
applying the clean hands doctrine.  Thus, the maxim entrusts a broad 
range of equitable discretion with courts in refusing to assist unclean 
litigants who attempt to make use of the judicial procedure in bad 
faith.123  The equity court “is not bound by formula or restrained by any 
limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of 
discretion.”124 
In the same spirit, a court of equity will not lend its support to 
enforce a patent that has been misused.  It will be preferable for patent-
misuse to stay open and flexible, in order to encompass all possible 
types of misconduct that adversely affects the opposing parties in the 
same litigation based on the patent at issue.125  This flexibility will offer 
the courts broad but necessary discretion to shy away from 
accommodating inequitable patent owners who may achieve 
unreasonable gains through judicial procedures, which in turn would be 
of vital importance for the courts to preserve their integrity as the 
administer of justice.126 
The facts in the present case provide a good example illustrating the 
possible type of patent abuse that would be expelled from the scope of 
the misuse doctrine by the restriction-on-licensee requirement.  
Assuming arguendo, that Philips and Sony colluded to prevent licensing 
the Lagadec patent separately with an aim to avoid a workable digital 
resolution of encoding the position information to be developed and 
 
121.  Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934). 
122.  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 814–15; Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit 
Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944); Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–46.  See also Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877 (1949). 
123.  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815; Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 
881 (3d Cir. 1959).  See also T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of 
Unclean Hands, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 509, 527–41, 558–59 (2010). 
124.  Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–46.  See also Gaudiosi, 269 F.2d at 881; 
Bishop v. Bishop, 257 F.2d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 1958). 
125. The qualified claimant of patent-misuse is not limited to the defendant that is 
actually affected by the asserted misbehavior.  The Princo en banc decision left this problem 
untouched.  For the need to establish standing requirement for the misuse doctrine see Mark 
A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. 
REV. 1599, 1618–19 (1990); Infra section IV.3. 
126.  Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 796 (1988).  See also Feldman, supra note 90, at 417; 
Leaffer, supra note 97, at 157. 
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compete with Philips’s Raaymakers analog technology.  The colluded 
constraint was on Sony, a licensor, and thus failed to fulfill the 
restriction-on-licensee requirement, and therefore, was not a patent-
misuse in the majority’s mind.  One group of victims under this 
collusion, however, was CD-R/RW manufacturers.  They suffered from 
high royalty rates and no alternatives in the encoding technology, yet 
were sued for infringement in the present case precisely due to the fact 
that they were unable to afford the expensive royalties resulting from 
the conspiracy.  Excluding that conspiracy from patent-misuse 
regretfully deprived the court of the necessary discretion in declining to 
execute that collusion against its victims.  The outcome contradicted the 
basic concerns of the unclean hands doctrine, and conspicuously 
demonstrated the significance of equitable flexibility for the patent-
misuse doctrine. 
Professor Merges hypothesized another perfect example of this 
point.127  Suppose a pharmaceutical company successfully develops an 
AIDS vaccine but refuses to sell or manufacture directly or through 
licensing in certain states because the rule of strict liability in those 
states makes it risky, or at least too burdensome, for the firm to make 
and distribute the vaccine.128  Would it be an advisable choice for courts 
to enforce the patent monopoly against residents in those states, barring 
them from using the vaccine to prevent the deadly disease and to save 
human lives?129  Should the courts be compelled to excuse that specific 
use of the patent rights from misuse allegations, just because it does not 
contain a restriction-on-licensees? 
Actually, apart from the patent-misuse doctrine, restraint-on-
competition is a common ground for unenforceability in contract and 
property law.  The focal points for judging unenforceability in this 
aspect are reasonableness of the constraint,130 its impact on 
competition,131 and whether it is ancillary to a valid transaction.132  All of 
 
127.  Merges, supra note 126, at 796–97. 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
130.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.6 (2000) (providing 
that “[a] servitude that imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or competition is 
invalid.”).  See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT § 5.3, at 322–23, 326–28 (4th ed. 
2004). 
131.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(2) (1981) (providing that 
“[a] promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business 
or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.”). 
132.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187–188 (1981).  See also 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, § 5.3 at 323–26. 
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these factors are flexible, open-ended conceptions.  No rigid limitation is 
built in to affect their adaptability.  This hundred-year common law 
wisdom should be of considerable value for contemporary patent courts.  
In light of the foreseeable polymorphism and unforeseeable strains of 
potential misbehaviors, it will be much wiser and pragmatic for the Fed. 
Cir. to maintain greater range and considerable flexibility, and, in the 
meantime, to refrain from creating restrictive requirements with regard 
to the applicable scope of the patent-misuse doctrine. 
V. FUNCTIONAL SELF-RETREAT: A GAP WITH ANTITRUST 
If using antitrust law as a yardstick in assessing the impact that the 
Princo decision brought about to the patent misuse-doctrine, one may 
obtain a more comprehensive understanding in the implications of this 
case.  With adoption of the restriction-on-licensee requirement, this 
decision excluded from the misuse doctrine those antitrust violations 
that involve patent right extension and anticompetitive restraint not 
explicitly imposed on the licensees.  Recognizing the equitable nature 
and spirit of unclean hands, as embodied in the misuse doctrine, 
however, the misbehaviors set aside by this ruling do not appear to be 
truly “clean” and qualify for the court’s aid with its execution.  Given 
the fact that misconduct violating section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act—
the key antitrust statute—are all felonies, it is really bizarre to hold that 
part of them merit the court’s protection and enforcement.  Are there 
any meaningful differences between the two categories that the decision 
treated differently, in particular, in terms of the potential inequity those 
misconducts may generate to defendants?  As long as the antitrust 
violations cannot be possible but for the patentees’ extension of patent 
rights beyond the patent grant, those violations have encroached the 
key thrust of the misuse doctrine, and nearly no reasonable ground 
could be raised to save them from the misuse allegations.133  Against this 
backdrop, it is not a surprise that Judge Prost made a candid remark in 
his concurring opinion: “ 
I do not share the majority’s apparent view that antitrust 
considerations are an entirely ‘different issue,’ separate and apart 
from the question of whether there has been patent misuse . . . .  
Whether use of a patent runs afoul of antitrust law seems in itself 
 
133.  Though stated in dictum, the Supreme Court indicated in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc. that “[i]t would be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that 
the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not constitute ‘misuse.’”  547 
U.S. 28, 42 (2006). 
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probative of whether the patent owner has also abused, or 
‘misused,’ the limited monopoly granted by Congress.134 
A. Retreating from Anticompetitive Behaviors 
In the present case, Phillips based its asserted conspiracy with Sony 
on its CD-R/RW patents, and expanded the patent rights beyond the 
boundary set by the patent office.  Using the Raymakers and other 
Orange Book patents as its cornerstone, Philips had three types of 
leverage to suppress the Lagadec technology.  First, Philips might 
oppose the Lagadec patent from being listed as essential for compliance 
with the Orange Book standard or selected into the joint-license 
package administered by Philips.  Second, Sony might not be able to 
enjoy a considerable share of the royalties accruing from the joint-
license package as it did in the present case.  In return for an 
insubstantial contribution to the Orange Book standard, Sony was 
rewarded a significant portion of the royalties.  For example, the 
Lagadec patent was nearly the only essential patent that Sony possessed 
in the CD-RW license package.  Notwithstanding, Sony received 36% of 
the royalties accruing from CD-RW joint licenses.135  During the 
development of the CD-RW specification, Sony employees were 
described as “more observers than real active developers.”136  Lastly, in 
order to enforce its alleged conspiracy with Sony, Philips could have 
refused to license the Orange Book patent package to the licensee of 
the Lagadec patent to punish Sony for cheating in their conspiracy and 
to suppress the emergence of alternative technology.137  These were all 
pivotal bargaining chips that Philips might have utilized in exchange for 
a non-compete-and-share agreement with Sony. 
In antitrust law, the noncompetition covenant, or market division 
agreement among horizontal competitors, might more often than not be 
analyzed under the rule of reason, on a condition that it is not a naked 
restraint on trade but is ancillary to a normal transaction or joint 
venture.138  Sometimes it is possible, however, that the court analyzes 
 
134.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Prost, J., 
concurring) (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 468 (1957) (emphasis 
added)). 
135.  Id. at 1344–45 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
136.  Id. at 1345 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (discussing testimony of Dr. Jacques Heemskerk, 
a Philips employee). 
137.  Id. at 1338. 
138.  See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Metro Indus. v. 
Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 
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this type of agreement under a per se illegal rule, and regardless of 
which rule is analyzed, it does not necessarily pass antitrust scrutiny.  
For example, the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to a non-
compete agreement in Palmer v. BRG.139  The agreement in question 
involved an excessive territorial market division between two competing 
bar review course providers in Athens, Georgia.140  The Court held this 
non-compete agreement was in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.141  In the present case, given the fact that there was no sufficient 
evidence to prove the agreement between Philips and Sony was 
necessary for their cooperation in developing the Orange Book 
standard, but instead some pieces of evidence indicated to the 
contrary,142 the non-compete agreement at issue might not be an 
ancillary restraint that could be readily justified under antitrust law.  In 
other word, the agreement between Philips and Sony may be considered 
as a naked restraint that should be analyzed under the rule of per se 
illegal, which does not permit taking into account asserted efficiency 
gains of the cooperation between competitors.  Without offsetting 
efficiencies from the joint venture to weigh against possible 
anticompetitive harms that the agreement generates to technology 
development and competition regarding CR-R/RW position 
information recording, the Philips-Sony conspiracy will probably have a 
net adverse impact on competition.  With adopting the restriction-on-
licensee requirement and shrinking the scope of misuse to be narrower 
than antitrust, however, the Fed. Cir. eschewed from suppressing this 
negative patent practice.  Instead, it chose to implement the monopoly 
of Orange Book standard and technologies that the conspiracy 
contributed to sustain against the victimized CR-R/RW manufacturers.  
Unfortunately, this holding disappointedly contradicts the court’s task 
of delivering and administering justice.  A thorough reflection, 
therefore, appears to be paramount for the court to apprehend its vital 
role and grave responsibilities in regulating patent-abusing behaviors. 
 
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
139.  Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
140.  Id. at 46–48. 
141.  Id. at 49–50.  
142.  The record shows the Lagadec technology was separately developed by Sony and 
presented to Philips, and was not a collaborative invention.  Besides the collusion at issue, 
there was no overall agreement that inhibited Sony from competing with the Orange Book 
joint venture.  See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1355 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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B. Functional Needs to Complement Antirust 
Apart from specific misconduct that the court might require, there 
are apparent gaps in the misuse doctrine and antitrust law that resulted 
from the Fed. Cir’s new rule.  Respondents of section 337 proceedings 
before the ITC can not raise antitrust counterclaims.  The patent-misuse 
doctrine is therefore the only defense respondents can rely on to 
repudiate the complainant’s anticompetitive behaviors.  Consequently, 
reducing the scope of the misuse doctrine would seriously affect the 
respondent’s procedural right to effectively defend against illegitimate 
allegations in an adjudicative process.  The respondents, whose misuse 
defense was ruled out, will have to initiate private antitrust litigation 
separately before the district court.  The complex situation of multiple 
litigations will materially impede speedy resolution of the entire dispute, 
and drain valuable resources of the parties and the courts.143  
Accordingly, relaxation of the control on the misuse doctrine, at least 
allowing it to encompass the entire field of antitrust law, is inevitably a 
necessary measure to avoid the multi-forum intricacy from routinely 
happening in section 337 proceedings.  In order to prevent a new class of 
antitrust lawsuits from being constantly initiated in the district courts, 
the Fed. Cir. needs to carefully reconsider its rulings and newly imposed 
requirement in its Princo decision. 
Beyond the ITC proceedings, patent-misuse is also capable of 
complementing the function of antitrust law.  U.S. antitrust law has long 
since suffered from over-deterrence due to the treble damage recovery 
awarded in private litigation.144  For this reason, antitrust law has 
developed a number of over-prudent rules and doctrines to constrain its 
private enforcement.  An “antitrust injury” must be demonstrated 
before private lawsuits can proceed to a jury trial.145  At the federal level, 
a “direct-purchaser” rule is in place to prohibit indirect purchasers from 
 
143.   See, e.g., Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941); 
Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of 
the Multidistrict Litigation Panel's Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2253–54 (2008); 
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, & Alan Hirsh, Judicial Federalism in Action: 
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1992). 
144.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 66–68 (Harvard University Press 2005). 
145.  The antitrust injury requirement asks the plaintiff to show her loss flow from the 
anticompetitive aspect of the alleged unlawful behavior, instead of the procompetitive aspect 
of the same conduct.  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 
1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).  
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recovering their losses from an antitrust offense.146  For instance, if a 
manufacturer violates antitrust law, causing damages to distributors and 
consumers of Product A, only those consumers that purchased Product 
A directly from the manufacturer can sue for damages.  Those that 
purchased from dealers and other distributors are not eligible to bring a 
lawsuit against the manufacturer.  These procedural thresholds and the 
heavy burden of proving market power in a well-defined relevant 
market147 could together give rise to the under-enforcement of antitrust 
law, especially in small or medium-scale violations.  In contrast, the 
misuse doctrine does not possess such a dreadful remedy, as it has fewer 
procedural and evidentiary requirements.  It is much more suitable for 
dealing with small or medium-scale misbehaviors that the scant antitrust 
enforcement may not adequately cover.  Abstaining from using this tool 
to regulate a substantial part of patent abuse not targeted at licensees, 
as the Fed. Cir. proclaimed in the Princo decision, will be a pity in light 
of its functional advantages.  A mutual supporting and complementing 
system of collaborating antitrust law and the misuse doctrine with fuller 
coverage will be a more balanced and satisfactory configuration. 
C. Establishing a Requirement for Standing 
Some commentators advocate total abolition of the patent-misuse 
doctrine, calling to replace it with antitrust law.  The key point of their 
argument is the substantial overlapping of this doctrine with antitrust 
rules, the latter seeming to be a more well-developed body of law with 
regards to regulating potential anticompetitive behaviors.148  
Overlapping in itself is scarcely sufficient to vindicate the eradication of 
a legal doctrine.  For instance, tort law and criminal law surely have 
regulated a vast, but common range of human activities, but abolishing 
one of them has barely been an issue of discussion.  The reasoning 
behind this phenomenon is two or more layers of regulation may 
sometimes be more preferable than a sole and concentrated one.  The 
true factor for their abolition lies instead in unnecessary waste and 
complexity.  The doctrine of patent-misuse has different goals and 
 
146.  Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728−29 (1977).  See also Princo Corp. v. 
ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Hovenkamp, supra 
note 144, at 72–76. 
147.  For the difficulty in market definition and market power measurement, see e.g., 
Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1805, 1807–09, 1813–18 (1990); Frederick M. Rowe, Market as Mirage, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 991, 991–96 (1987). 
148.  The most prominent figure in this camp is Judge Posner.  See USM Corp. v. SPS 
Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982). 
WANG- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2011  11:06 AM 
78  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:1 
 
principles than antitrust law.  As a defense in infringement suits, the 
doctrine emphasizes the prevention of patent owner’s circumvention 
over the patent boundary.149  The misuse and antitrust regimes also have 
divergent remedies and procedural postures.  U.S. antitrust regime has 
its own weak points, such as ITC section 337 proceedings and strict 
requirements for private litigants, where the misuse doctrine can 
precisely play a positive role in filling in those gaps.150  It would not be a 
layer of redundant regulation as those commentators denote. 
Other critics of the misuse doctrine were focused on the difference 
between its remedy and the harm that misbehaviors generate, in 
particular the rule that every infringer of the patent can lodge the 
misuse defense no matter whether she is personally victimized or not.151  
The origin of this defense—the unclean hands doctrine—is not a 
regulatory scheme that manipulates the punishment in proportion to the 
harm that the misbehavior achieves.  The focus of this doctrine turns on 
the question of whether the plaintiff’s pleading merits the aid of the 
court as the custodian of justice.  From this perspective, proportionality 
might not be the only and best standard to determine the success or 
demise of the misuse doctrine.  This does not mean that the misuse 
defense should be available to irrelevant patent infringers.  Patent 
owner’s misbehaviors that have no relation with the transaction or 
market at question will not impinge upon the alleged infringer in the 
specific infringement litigation.  It will be a pure windfall for unaffected 
infringers to claim the misuse defense based on the suffering of 
someone else.  In order to avoid rewarding infringers who do not suffer 
from the patentee’s misbehaviors, a requirement on standing to confine 
the misuse defense to those who are actually affected by the alleged 
misbehaviors should be established.  The integrity of justice 
administration will not be tainted if the court executes the patent right 
against unaffected infringers.  Traditionally, the doctrine of unclean 
hands also retains a similar limitation to prevent abuse.152 
 
149.  See supra Part II.2.  
150.  See supra Part IV. 1−2. 
151.  Cotter, supra note 97, at 902, 908−09; Lemley, Comment, supra note 125, at 
1614−20. 
152.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (describing the unclean hands doctrine as “a party guilty of 
inequitable conduct in the underlying transaction may on that account be denied a claim”) 
(emphasis added). 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Princo en banc decision appears to be another important step 
by the Fed. Cir. to restrain the strength and scope of the patent-misuse 
doctrine.  The court began the long course in 1986 in the Windsurfing 
case, where it imposed a new element, “having anticompetitive effect,” 
to the Supreme Court’s traditional test for this defense.  In the present 
case, the Fed. Cir. majority proceeds to create another element—
restriction-on-licensees only—to the existing criteria.  There is no 
reliable way to assure what mobilizes the court to forge such a long and 
consistent endeavor in controlling this doctrine.  The court has not 
sufficiently disclosed specific rationales and overall evaluations that 
support this project.  As acknowledged in this article, the misuse 
doctrine needs improvement, such as adding a new requirement on 
standing to confine it to infringers actually suffering from the misuse.  A 
substantial curtailment of this doctrine, however, still seems too early to 
stage.  Through detailed analysis of the Princo decision, this essay 
demonstrates that the holding of this case deviates from Supreme Court 
precedent and previous Fed. Cir. and appellate court precedent.  It also 
ignores the importance of equitable nature and discretional flexibility 
originally embedded in the doctrine.  Functionally speaking, the court’s 
ruling retreats from suppressing certain patent abuse, creating evident 
gaps and disjuncture with antitrust law.  It is the author’s hope that the 
Princo decision is an end to the beginning, not a beginning to end.  
Instead of substantially weakening the misuse doctrine, this decision 
could be an excellent stimulus and starting point for careful reflection 
on its function, foundation, and better configuration. 
